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FIRST AMENDMENT LAW—THE REGULATION OF
RELIGIOUS LOBBYISTS: A SPIRITUAL BATTLE FOR THE
SOUL OF DEMOCRACY
Nicholas Melvin Smith*
Governmental transparency is among the most fundamental
requirements of a democracy. This belief is the backbone of codes of
ethics amongst both states and the federal government. Codes of ethics
universally apply to state employees, as well as those attempting to
influence policy. We call these influencers lobbyists. Every state
regulates the actions of lobbyists. Some states have broad, sweeping
language that requires lobbyists to report a great deal of information to
the state, which is then made public to voters, while other states allow
for express exemptions to keep certain actions out of the public eye.
Because the federal government does not provide many guidelines or
restrictions on what can be included in lobbyist regulation, the states
have free reign to regulate as they please. Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Iowa, and Georgia have been able to include broad exemptions to
lobbyist filing and disclosure rules for those lobbying on behalf of a
religious institution. Other states, like Connecticut, have made no direct
mention of religious organizations in their regulations, but have changed
the rules to appease or benefit religious groups. These examples raise
serious concerns about favoring religious speech over non-religious
speech.
This Note argues for a more uniform method of regulation on lobbying,
the goal being to avoid favoring religious lobbying over non-religious
lobbying. The need for a more uniform method of regulation will be

* Nicholas Smith is a candidate for J.D. at the Western New England University
School of Law and a Note Editor for Western New England Law Review. He spent his 1L
summer working for the Connecticut Office of State Ethics as a legal intern. He also
worked for several religious organizations. His experiences in lobbying regulation and
religious life gave him a unique perspective on the regulation of religious lobbyists and he
tried to approach the topic with both interests at heart.
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demonstrated by addressing serious policy concerns as well as applying
principles of the First Amendment regarding both the Freedom of Speech
and Free Exercise of Religion.

INTRODUCTION
“[P]olitics is the allocation of governmental resources; it is who gets
what, when, where, why, and how.”1 This idea eloquently explains the
need for interest groups, which are organizations made up of lobbyists.
Naturally, everyone wants a bigger piece of the pie. That is, clients are
willing to pay representatives to further their agenda before a governing
body.2 Lobbyists are these representatives, and their primary goal is to
inform and convince lawmakers that their client’s position on an issue is
the right one.3 This has encouraged the presence of lobbyists in the United
States since its founding.4 Because of the rapid growth of lobbying in the
modern era,5 every state has a lobbying law to prescribe what is and what
is not lobbying, as well as who is and who is not a lobbyist.6
1. RONALD J. HREBENAR & BRYSON B. MORGAN, LOBBYING IN AMERICA: A
REFERENCE HANDBOOK 1 (2009).
2. See 2 U.S.C. § 1602(2) (2018) (“The term ‘client’ means any person or entity that
employs or retains another person for financial or other compensation to conduct lobbying
activities on behalf of that person or entity.”).
3. See id.; see also Lobbying, BBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/politics/82529.stm [https://perma.cc/DF33-MSYM].
4. See HREBENAR & MORGAN, supra note 1, at 2.
5. Id. at 110.
6. See ALA. CODE § 36-25-1.1 (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.171 (2018); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1231 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-8-402 (2018); CAL. GOV’T. CODE
§ 86300 (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-301 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-91 (2018);
DEL. CODE ANN tit. 29, § 5831 (2018); D.C. CODE § 1-1161.01 (2018); FLA. STAT. § 11.045
(2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-70 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 97-1 (2018); IDAHO CODE § 676602 (2018); 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 170/2 (2018); IND. CODE § 2-7-1-9 (2018); IOWA CODE
§ 68B.2 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-222 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.611 (West 2018);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 24:51 (2018); ME. STAT. tit.3, § 312-A (2018); MD. CODE ANN. GEN. PROVIS.
§ 5-702 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 3, § 39 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 4.415 (2018);
MINN. STAT. § 10A.01 (2018); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 5-8-3 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.470
(2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-102 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1433 (2018); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 218H.080 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13C-20
(West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-2 (2018); N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 1-C (McKinney 2018);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-250 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-05.1-02 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 101.70 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 4249 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 171.725
(2018); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13A03 (2018); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-139.1-3 (2018); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 2-17-10 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-12-1, -15 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 3-6-301 (2018); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.003 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11102 (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 261 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-419 (2018); WASH.
REV. CODE § 42.17A.005 (2018); W. VA. CODE § 6B-3-1 (2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.62
(West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 28-7-101 (2018); see also How States Define Lobbying and
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These laws exist not to restrict the speech of lobbyists, but to require
lobbyists to file registration papers with the state and disclose the amount
of money and time they spend lobbying.7 Further,
[L]obbying that occurs in the open is less objectionable than lobbying
that occurs behind closed doors. Statements made in public by
lobbyists can be scrutinized by others and challenged with competing
facts and arguments. The resulting public debate is consistent with a
healthy political process. In contrast, statements made by lobbyists
that are hidden from public view cannot easily be probed or disputed.
Consequently, inaccurate assertions may go uncontested. Lobbyist
disclosure requirements reflect these concerns.8

These laws differ throughout the nation—so much so that nearly all
of them have at least one significant difference from the others.9 Notable
among these differences is that many states include exemptions for
religious lobbyists.10 These laws vary in severity.11 In South Carolina,
for instance, a
“[l]obbyist” does not include . . . a person who represents any
established church solely for the purpose of protecting the rights of the
membership of the church or for the purpose of protecting the
doctrines of the church or on matters considered to have an adverse
effect upon the moral welfare of the membership of the church.12
Lobbyist, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-lobby-definitions.aspx
[https://perma.cc/J28T-YVHH] (last updated Feb. 8, 2019) [hereinafter States Define
Lobbying]. This source includes a detailed list of state lobbying definitions and, with its builtin search bar, comparing religious exemptions is as simple as searching for the word “religious.”
Id.
7. See Lobbyist Regulation: Overview, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/
lobbyist-regulation.aspx [https://perma.cc/DKX8-5GVX] [hereinafter Overview].
8. Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 49 (2006).
9. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-91 (providing that registering as a lobbyist requires a
person to spend three thousand dollars or more in the furtherance of lobbying in any calendar
year), with OR. REV. STAT. § 171.725 (prescribing that “money or any other consideration” as
a payment constitutes lobbying).
10. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 86300(c); 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 170/2; IOWA CODE
§ 68B.2; MD. CODE ANN. GEN. PROVIS. § 5-702(b)(1)(iii); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f)
(the South Carolina law specifically exempts those representing a “church,” rather than any
religious actor).
11. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-70(5) (defining lobbyist with no exemptions for
religious organizations), with MD. CODE ANN. GEN. PROVIS. § 5-702(b)(1)(iii) (“[Exemption
for] representation of a bona fide religious organization . . . for the purpose of protecting the
right of its members to practice the doctrine of the organization.”), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 217-10(13)(f) (extending protection to representatives of “any established church”).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f).
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This broad exemption affords lobbyists working on behalf of a church
the potential to widely abuse their ability to sway the government without
the public knowing.
Ultimately, the problem is the possibility of abuse, not actual
quantifiable damage done. That is not to discredit the cognizable damage
that exists when a state favors religious speech over non-religious speech.
Religious exemptions in lobbying laws are problematic because they
allow for situations where religious groups could abuse their exemptions
and sway politicians without disclosing their actions to the public.13 There
is also realized harm in the fact that religious institutions are receiving a
benefit not offered to similarly situated, yet non-religious, groups.14 For
instance, in South Carolina, a lobbyist on behalf of a church could spend
any sum of money to sway legislation—or even an election, so long as it
was logically or at the very least arguably, “considered to have an adverse
effect upon the moral welfare of the membership of the church.”15
Specifically, it is possible that a church’s lobbyist in South Carolina
would be able to spend an undisclosed sum of money to sway the
legislature from passing a law on abortion.16 It is not unheard of for a
religious group to lobby against a reproductive bill.17 However, under the
same law, the opportunity to spend undisclosed amounts of money would
not be afforded to a lobbyist from a non-religious non-profit
organization.18 In fact, under this law, it is entirely possible that this
benefit would only be awarded to Christian lobbyists, as the law
specifically declares an exemption for those “representing a church.”19
13. See AM. BAR ASS’N, THE LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL
LOBBYING LAW AND PRACTICE 8 (William V. Luneberg et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009). “Government
has lost hundreds of millions of dollars which it should not have lost if there had been proper
publicity given to the activities of lobbyists” prior to the passage of Federal Regulation of
Lobbyists Act. Id.
14. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.”).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f).
16. See, e.g., Abortion and Morality: Religious and Moral Influence on the Debate, PEW
RES. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/01/support-for-abortion-slips5/
[https://perma.cc/66VA-G7YL] (“One-third of Americans (32%) say their religious beliefs are
the primary influence on their attitudes toward abortion.”).
17. See generally Zoë Robinson, The Contraception Mandate and the Forgotten
Constitutional Question, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 749, 793–98 (2014) (examining the manner in
which a religious lobbying group may challenge a contraception bill).
18. See § 2-17-10(13)(f).
19. See id.
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The problem here is obvious: the South Carolina Ethics Code grants
obvious favoritism to Christian speech over non-Christian and nonreligious speech.
The ambiguous structure of religious lobbying regulations is
attempting to provide broad protections for religious expression, as
required by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,20 but
these laws create a systemic preferential treatment towards religious
speech.21 This creates a danger to the First Amendment as a prohibition
on non-religious speech.22 This Note argues that the broad nature of
religious exemptions in lobbying regulations inadvertently favors
religious speech over non-religious speech, indirectly violating the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. This notion will be
demonstrated by applying precedent from the Supreme Court on similar,
although not directly related, issues and arguing that this issue should be
viewed in the same light.
Specifically turning to religion, several states have carved out
exemptions for churches or religious organizations in their lobbying
bills.23 Instead of evaluating every ethics law and their subsequent
exceptions, explicit or otherwise, this Note will group them into three
categories. The first category is problematic religious exemptions. This
includes states, like South Carolina and Maryland,24 with such broad
exemptions for religious bodies that they effectively grant favoritism
toward religious speech over non-religious speech. One of the most
prominent issues with problematic religious exemptions is the prevalence
of language which exempts actors from a “bona fide religious
organization.”25 The Court has been reluctant to rule on what is and is not
a religion and giving this deference to the states presents serious
problems.26

20. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2005) (exploring legislative action to
accommodate religious practice without violating the Establishment clause).
21. See, e.g., § 2-17-10(13)(f).
22. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688, 690–93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(explaining the negative message Endorsement sends to nonadherents).
23. See sources cited supra note 10.
24. MD. CODE ANN. GEN. PROVIS. § 5-702(b)(1)(iii) (West 2018); § 2-17-10(13)(f).
25. States Define Lobbying, supra note 6.
26. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(illustrating that defining what is and is not considered a religious organization presents a serious
problem, and that laws citing bona-fide religious organization require the governing body to
make this determination). Such a distinction is complex and could easily be abused. Id.
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The next category is permissible laws—laws with a religious
exemption that does not violate the First Amendment. These laws
explicitly carve out an exemption for religious activity, but do so in a way
that does not benefit or harm religious institutions.27 This can be seen in
the religious exemptions to the lobbying law in North Carolina, which “do
not include communications or activities as part of a business, civic,
religious, fraternal, personal, or commercial relationship which is not
connected to legislative or executive action, or both.”28 This type of
exempted activity is important because it allows lawmakers and lobbyists
to belong to the same groups, religious or otherwise, without running afoul
of the ethics code.
However, this exemption does not cover
communication that attempts to affect the lawmaking process.29
The last category is optimal laws—those that make no explicit
mention of religious organizations, which are the largest grouping of
states’ laws. Every state has some law defining what a lobbyist is, whether
they have an enforcement body or not.30 Forty-one states make no
mention of religious groups in this definition of lobbyist.31 In broadly
looking to these categories of laws, this Note will demonstrate that laws
with explicit religious exemptions present serious First Amendment issues
needing to be addressed.
Part I of this Note will evaluate a detailed history of the evolution of
religious beliefs in the context of the way people view the divine through
the lens of their own desires. It will then provide a background on several
political philosophies in application to how lobbying laws are passed and
27. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-250(a)(17) (2018).
28. Id.
29. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-250(a)(36).
30. States Define Lobbying, supra note 6.
31. See ALA. CODE § 36-25-1.1 (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.171 (2018); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1231 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-8-402 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6301 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-91 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 5831 (2018); FLA.
STAT. § 11.045 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-70 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 97-1 (2018);
IDAHO CODE § 67-6602 (2018); IND. CODE § 2-7-1-9 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-222
(2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.611 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 24:51 (2018); ME. STAT.
tit. 3, § 312-A (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 3, § 39 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 4.415 (2018);
MINN. STAT. § 10A.01 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.470 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7102 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1433 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 218H.080 (2017); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13C-20 (West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 2-11-2 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-05.1-02 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.70 (West
2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 4249 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 171.725 (2018); 65 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 13A03 (2018); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-139.1-3 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-12-1
(2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3-6-301 (2018); TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 305.003 (2018); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 261 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-419 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 42.17A.005 (2018); W. VA. CODE § 6B-3-1 (2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.62 (West 2018);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 28-7-101 (2018).

2019]

THE REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS LOBBYISTS

339

why the act of lobbying is effective. It will conclude by describing some
important aspects of the First Amendment, particularly the chilling effect
doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine.
Part II of this Note will evaluate religious lobbying exemptions in
three categories. The first category includes laws that are facially
unconstitutional as a violation of the Establishment Clause; the second
includes laws that do not present obvious constitutional issues but are
nonetheless suboptimal; and the third includes laws that make no mention
of religion.
Part III of this Note will argue for a uniform application of regulations
to religious and secular lobbyists. It will argue that Connecticut has the
most effective measure for allowing certain benefits to religious groups,
without violating the First Amendment.
I.

A HISTORY OF RELIGION, POLITICAL THEORY, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

Organized religion has been at the forefront of American politics
since its foundation, “play[ing] a vital role in virtually every major
political issue in the history of the United States.”32 Religious scholars
and leaders have been on each side of major issues since this country’s
inception.33 This fact is also true of state legislatures—not just the federal
government.34 As lobbying becomes more prevalent, the issues that arise
with it—like minimal transparency—also grow.35
Further, due to the proliferation of lobbyists in the modern United
States, every state has passed a law to define who is a lobbyist, what
lobbying is, and how to regulate it.36 Since the creation of the first state
ethics commission in Hawaii in 1968, forty states have established their
own official ethics commissions,37 Vermont being the most recent state to

32. DANIEL J. B. HOFRENNING, IN WASHINGTON BUT NOT OF IT: THE PROPHETIC
POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS LOBBYING 1 (1995).
33. See id.
34. REPRESENTING GOD AT THE STATEHOUSE vii (Edward L. Cleary & Allen D. Hertzke
eds., 2006).
35. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?,
26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 562 (2008) (arguing that businesses will spend whatever it takes
to lobby the government, and that it is ineffective to publicize or tax lobbying).
36. Overview, supra note 7; see also States Define Lobbying, supra note 6.
37. Megan Comlossy, Ethics Commissions: Representing the Public Interest,
LEGISLATIVE LAWYER 1, 2 (2011), made available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/lsss/
ethics_commissions.pdf [https://perma.cc/PFC6-5FH2]. Since the publication of this article,
Vermont has established its own ethics commission. See An Act Relating to Establishing the
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do so.38 The remaining states have ethics committees made up of state
officials.39
Such “watchdog” agencies exist to provide transparency to the public
and oversight to the government.40 Typically, they do so in two distinct
ways.41 The first is through a legal division.42 Offices of state ethics
typically have an advisory legal branch, which members of the state
government—or the public—can contact with questions pertaining to real
situations and the application of the law.43 The second way is through
prosecution, and most states have a specific prosecutorial division.44
Generally, this division reviews possible ethics violations by legislators,
government officials, or lobbyists and prosecutes the violations before
their state’s board.45
The prevalence of lobbyists is apparent,46 but religious lobbying has
the proclivity to slip through the cracks. These lobbying groups tend to
be unregistered, so tracking their actions is nearly impossible, and, further,
only a small group of religious lobbyists have official “Political Action
Committees.”47 The involvement of evangelical Christians is important
in American politics, as they make up a considerable portion of the
electorate.48 These voters traditionally vote for Republicans,49 largely
thanks to President Ronald Reagan and his efforts in the 1980s to involve

State Ethics Commission and Standards of Governmental Ethical Conduct, 2017 Vt. Acts &
Resolves 79.
38. 2017 Vt. Acts & Resolves 79.
39. See Comlossy, supra note 37.
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Agency Units, OFF. ST. ETHICS, http://ct.gov/ethics/cwp/
view.asp?a=3510&q=415018 [https://perma.cc/9WQH-HPBV] (explaining the distinct
functions of the two branches of the ethics office, including the Legal and Enforcement
divisions).
42. Id.
43. E.g., id.
44. E.g., id.
45. See, e.g., id.
46. See generally Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/ [https://perma.cc/N2WE-YQ4N] (demonstrating the constant increase in annual lobbyist
expenditures).
47. See HOFRENNING, supra note 32, at 189.
48. See Religious Landscape Study, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewforum.org/religiouslandscape-study/ [https://perma.cc/2V7U-B538] (finding that evangelical Christians make up
more than a quarter of voters).
49. See Michael Lipka, U.S. Religious Groups and Their Political Leanings, PEW RES.
CTR. (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/23/u-s-religious-groupsand-their-political-leanings/ [https://perma.cc/6XSY-LPGB].
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evangelicals in politics.50 The prevalence of religion in politics has
certainly stuck around, and now the evangelical vote is highly sought
after.51 Religious groups are increasingly complicated to regulate when it
comes to lobbying because many of them are not registered lobbyists,
which is forbidden under their status as a tax-exempt 501(c)(3)
organization.52 This makes balancing their regulation with the intricacies
of the tax code quite difficult and could be why many states choose to
exempt them from lobbying registration.53 However, this is problematic,
as it inherently creates favoritism for religious affiliation or expression
over the same non-religious expression.54 States should remedy this
problem by prohibiting beneficial treatment for religious groups, and this
Note will provide suggestions for how to best achieve this goal.
The primary focus of ethics law is to increase transparency between
the citizens of each state and their governments.55 So then why would
some states elect to muddy the waters by exempting some of the largest
interest groups in the country? This is a complex question—one that
requires introspection on the way society views religion and how it uses
religion to interact with each other. This question also requires a
discussion of the political interest lawmakers have in passing certain
statutes.

50. HOFRENNING, supra note 32, at 36–37.
51. Brian Vines, The Evangelical Vote: Will 94 Million Americans Sit Out This Year’s
Election?, GUARDIAN (June 21, 2016, 11:29 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/jun/21/evangelical-vote-us-elections [https://perma.cc/XP5E-JDHD]; see also Gregory A.
Smith, Churchgoing Republicans, Once Skeptical of Trump, Now Support Him, PEW RES. CTR.
(July 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/21/churchgoing-republicansonce-skeptical-of-trump-now-support-him/ [https://perma.cc/SR82-9H2U].
52. See HOFRENNING, supra note 32, at 189. Section 501(c)(3) is ultimately a tax-exempt
status held by many religious organizations. The benefits of this tax-exempt status come with
restrictions, specifically a prohibition on “influenc[ing] legislation . . . or interven[ing]
in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).
53. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Under this section of the tax code, an organization does not
qualify for exemption if a “substantial part of [its] activit[y]” is lobbying. Id. Regulations could
create complications in determining what is “substantial.” See also Political Campaign
Activities—Risks
to
Tax-Exempt
Status,
NAT’L
COUNCIL
NONPROFITS,
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/political-campaign-activities-risks-taxexempt-status [https://perma.cc/4RQH-UZNY]. “Lobbying is NOT the same as political
campaign activity. Engaging in lobbying by charitable nonprofits is permitted, but expending
more than an ‘insubstantial’ amount of energy or resources towards lobbying activities can be
problematic.” Id.
54. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 719 (2005) (holding that an endorsement of
multiple religions is as unconstitutional as an endorsement of one single religion).
55. See Comlossy, supra note 37, at 1.
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A. What is Religion?
Religion plays a vital role in American life.56 A 2015 study found
that approximately seventy-six percent of Americans identify as religious
in one way or another.57 The overwhelming majority of Americans—
some seventy percent—belong to a Christian faith.58 But why does the
religious makeup of the country affect the political process? The answer
is not as simple as discussing the foundation of the United States and the
inherent religiosity of its people. The real answer lies much further back
in our collective history.59
To understand religion’s influence on politics, one must understand
religion. The foundations of human faith date as far back as we can trace
our ancestors—all the way to the cave paintings that signify the migratory
patterns of homo-sapiens.60 Scholars contend that the placement,
consistency, and substance of these cave paintings indicate that they are
representative of Paleolithic humans’ religious beliefs.61 One idea of the
Paleolithic human religious experience suggests that they believed in a
“tiered cosmos.”62 This theory suggests that the Paleolithic humans
believed that by crawling remarkably deep within caves, they could
immerse themselves in a separate realm of the cosmos; one that existed
deep within the earth.63 They painted these caves full of images that laid
out the Paleolithic view of the divine.64 As they moved through the caves,

56. See generally Chapter 1: Importance of Religion and Religious Beliefs, PEW RES.
CTR. (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/chapter-1-importance-of-religionand-religious-beliefs/ [https://perma.cc/6CFC-HXBB] (explaining the importance of religious
beliefs in American life).
57. See Religious Landscape Study, PEW RES. CTR. (May 12, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ [https://perma.cc/2V7U-B538].
58. Id.
59. See generally REZA ASLAN, GOD: A HUMAN HISTORY (2017) (explaining a detailed
history of the evolution of human thought on God).
60. DAVID LEWIS-WILLIAMS, CONCEIVING GOD: THE COGNITIVE ORIGIN AND
EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 210 (2010); see also ASLAN, supra note 59, at 7–16.
61. See LEWIS-WILLIAMS, supra note 60, at 7–16; c.f. Kevin Sharpe & Leslie Van Gelder,
Human Uniqueness and Upper Paleolithic ‘Art’: An Archaeologist’s Reaction to Wentzel van
Huyssteen’s Gifford Lectures, 28 AM. J. THEOLOGY & PHIL. 311 (2006) (arguing against a
religious interpretation of the cave painting but noting that many scholars have argued for a
religious contextual interpretation of the “art”).
62. See LEWIS-WILLIAMS, supra note 60, at 210.
63. See ASLAN, supra note 59, at 8.
64. See id.
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the paintings got more detailed.65 Perhaps the most impressive of these
early human paintings is one called “The Sorcerer.”66
This painting was discovered in 1914, and was instantly recognized
as a special symbol of cult worship.67 The original discoverer of the cave
painting, Henri Breuil, a French priest, made a tracing of the painting and
published it along with his notes about the cave in 1920.68 In his notes, he
referred to the painting as the first known image of God.69 Whether the
Paleolithic humans that painted the image believed it was God is a matter
up for debate, but it is at least clear that the image depicted a deeply held
religious idea.70 This idea is the interconnectedness of the world, which
is something scholars have known about the Paleolithic people for some
time; it is an idea they have coined as animism.71 This first conception of
a religious belief is that everything is connected by something: a spirit, an
essence, a soul—something transcendent from the body.72 Animism is not
inherently a religion, but it is a foundational belief that, over time, evolved
into organized religion.73
The evolution of religion can be seen in the progress from cave
paintings and burial mounds to the complex structure of early temples.74
Göbekli Tepe is the earliest known temple in the world, dating somewhere

65. See id. at 8–17 (exploring how the cave paintings developed from the front of the cave
into the depths).
66. Id. at 16.
67. Trois Frères: Cave, Ariège, France, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Trois-Freres#Article-History
[https://perma.cc/ZB5TJ4W9]; see also ASLAN, supra note 59, at 17.
68. ASLAN, supra note 59, at 9–18; see also Henri Begouen, Un Dessin Relevé Dans la
Caverne des Trois-Frères, à Montesquieu-Avantès (Ariège) 64 COMPTES RENDUS DES SÉANCES
DE
L’ACADÉMIE
DES
INSCRIPTIONS ET BELLES-LETTRES 303, 305 (1920),
http://www.persee.fr/doc/crai_0065-0536_1920_num_64_4_74336 [https://perma.cc/47RYPV2Z]. The original journal is rather obscure and completely in French. The University of De
Lyon in France has made it publicly available through its free online digital library.
69. See ASLAN, supra note 59, at 9–18; see also Begouen, supra note 68.
70. See generally Alberto C. Blanc, Some Evidence for the Ideologies of Early Man, in
SOCIAL LIFE OF EARLY MAN (1961). This book attempts to reconstruct the life of early
societies; particular emphasis is laid upon social behavior among primates, as well as
approaches from ethnology, prehistoric archaeology, geography, genetics, human stress
biology, and psychology. Id.
71. ASLAN, supra note 59, at 6–7.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 7 & n.7 (arguing that animism was the first step in the evolution of human
thought on God).
74. Id. at 7–8.
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around 9600 to 8000 BCE; it sits in modern day southeastern Turkey.75
The pillars in the center of Göbekli Tepe are not quite pillars at all—they
have arms adorned with jewelry, loincloths around their waists, and
rectangular, undecorated heads.76 These humanoid figures without faces
are thought to be an abstraction of a deity.77 This temple with the faceless
gods is not close to a source of water, and there are no signs of dwelling
places nearby, which indicates that the temple was traveled to, that it is,
perhaps, a holy site.78 From the Paleolithic cave painting of God to the
Neolithic statues, the divine became less an amalgamation of man and
beast, but more uniquely human.79
This trend of developing a human version of the divine continued for
several thousand years.80 The use of human terms and imagery can be
seen in all of the world’s major religions, even nontheistic religions like
Buddhism or Jainism.81
In fact, the entire history of human spirituality can be viewed as one
long, interconnected, ever-evolving, and remarkably cohesive effort to
make sense of the divine by giving it our emotions and our
personalities, by ascribing to it our traits and our desires, by providing
it with our strengths and our weaknesses, even our own bodies—in
short, by making God us.82

That is to say, our deepest ideas of the divine are conditioned by our
understanding of ourselves. Through the evolution of our thought on God,
we have consistently intensified our personification of our perception of
the divine.83
Human characteristics bestowed upon the divine are evidenced in a
number of examples,84 but are nowhere more obvious than America’s
75. CLAUDIA SAGONA, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF PUNIC MALTA: FROM THE NEOLITHIC TO
THE ROMAN PERIOD 47 (2015).
76. ASLAN, supra note 59, at 55.
77. Id. at 55–57.
78. Id. at 54–55.
79. See id. at 57.
80. See id. at xiii.
81. Id. at xiv–xv.
82. Id. at xiii.
83. Id. at 49–107 (exploring the humanization of God throughout the evolution of
religions, from ancient to modern).
84. See REZA ASLAN, NO GOD BUT GOD: THE ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND FUTURE OF
ISLAM (2005) (exploring the evolution of religion); BRITANNICA EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHING,
MESOPOTAMIAN GODS & GODDESSES (2014) (explaining the religious beliefs of the
Mesopatamians); FRED W. CLOTHEY, RELIGION IN INDIA: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
(2006) (explaining religious traditions and beliefs in India); JOHN DAY, YAHWEH AND THE
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most popular religion—Christianity.85 The Christian tradition of a
completely human and completely divine savior of the world is quite
familiar to the modern reader.86 However, this idea was extremely
controversial to the early church.87
Through all of religious history, humankind has consistently
personified the very notion of the divine;88 the theology of which could
fill volumes. But what is apparent about this humanizing of God is that it
helps to understand the convictions and beliefs of religious lobbyists.89
These lobbyists believe they are acting out the will of the divine, which
makes them much harder to negotiate with than a lobbyist who is just in it
for the money. Before one can fully understand that process though, the
politics of lobbying must be addressed.
B. A Background on Political Theory and the Political Process
Why does lobbying work? That question begs a more fundamental
one—why do politicians vote the way that they do? This question,

GODS AND GODDESSES OF CANAAN (2000) (exploring the Canaanite faith and its many deities);
JON MIKALSON, ANCIENT GREEK RELIGION (2005) (exploring the religious practices of the
ancient Greeks); PETER HARVEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO BUDDHISM: TEACHINGS, HISTORY
AND PRACTICES (1990) (reviewing the history and evolution of the Buddhist faith); JENNY
ROSE, ZOROASTRIANISM: AN INTRODUCTION (2011) (explaining the Zoroastrian faith);
ALFRED WIEDEMANN, RELIGION OF THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS (1897) (taking an in-depth look
at the religious practice of the ancient Egyptian civilization).
85. Cf. John 1:14. The author of the Gospel of John writes, “[t]he Word became flesh and
made his dwelling among us. We have seen his glory, the glory of the one and only Son, who
came from the Father, full of grace and truth.” Id. In saying this, the author is inherently
claiming both the divinity and humanity of Jesus. While he is not arguing the same point as this
Note, his argument is analogous to the stated claim. The Christian tradition moves ahead of all
the other world’s religions in humanizing the divine by holding that God was quite literally a
human at one point in time. The Christian tradition holds belief in a Trinitarian view of God,
which is that God exists in three distinct bodies, while maintaining unity. The Gospel of John
is among the most profound sources for this claim in the Christian tradition, as it moves
significantly past the monotheistic foundations of Judaism and blazes a new trail of semimonotheistic Trinitarian-ism. Accord ASLAN, supra note 59, at 129–46; REZA ASLAN, ZEALOT:
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JESUS OF NAZARETH 163–216 (2013).
86. See generally ALISTER E. MCGRATH, CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION
(Blackwell, 6th ed. 2017) (detailing the history of theological views of Christian scholars).
87. See generally JUSTO GONZÁLEZ, THE STORY OF CHRISTIANITY (1984) (including a
detailed historical analysis of the history of Christianity and particularly the first Council of
Nicaea); see also ASLAN supra note 59, at 141–46.
88. ASLAN, supra note 59, at xiv–xv.
89. See generally HOFRENNING, supra note 32 (explaining why and how religious
lobbyists act differently than non-religious lobbyists).
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unfortunately, does not have one simple and concise answer.90 However,
it can be answered, at least somewhat, through an understanding of a few
political theories and their real-world application.91
The first important discussion in understanding the political process
should be reviewing why and how government exists. John Locke is
perhaps the most notable thinker to explore this realm of thought.92 He
claimed that all men are inherently free and that the existence of the
government was simply a social contract, which is a consent to forgo some
freedoms in exchange for the enjoyment of stable and comfortable lives.93
This is called social contract theory.94 It ultimately holds that the
governing body of any land is only in power by the express or tacit consent
of the people.95 That is, all power in politics ultimately originates from
the governed, not the government.96
Next, Anthony Downs theorized that if constituencies were perfectly
informed, politicians would naturally assume the political stance preferred
by the median voter.97 However, he argues that the public stays
uninformed, allowing politicians to deviate from this economic model.98
This idea is an application of economic game theory to politics.99 The
primary purpose of game theory is to describe why humans act the way

90. See SUDHA SETTY, NATIONAL SECURITY SECRECY: COMPARATIVE EFFECTS ON
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 40 (2017) (explaining political realism theory and why
politicians make the decisions they make).
91. See id. at 37–41.
92. See generally W. JULIAN KORAB- KARPOWICZ, ON THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS FROM THUCYDIDES TO LOCKE (2012)
(demonstrating the evolution of political history leading up to John Locke). John Locke was an
enlightenment-era philosopher and is hailed as the father of liberalism. Id. His thoughts on
liberal theory and classical republicanism can be seen in the writings of the founders of the
United States and even in the Declaration of Independence. Id.
93. See Alex Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(Summer
2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/locke-political/
[https://perma.cc/8GJ2-V4YN].
94. See id.; Social Contract, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA https://www.britannica.com/
topic/social-contract [https://perma.cc/84KK-UYKS].
95. Tuckness, supra note 93.
96. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
97. See generally Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a
Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135 (1957) (explaining political actions through the lens of
economics). Anthony Downs is an economist specializing in public policy. See PATRICIA
MOSS WIGFALL & BEHROOZ KALANTARI, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 25 (2001).
98. See Downs, supra note 97, at 139.
99. See id. at 135–39.
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they do.100 In application to politics, it has been used to explain
democratic peace,101 to mitigate the Cuban Missile Crisis,102 and as a
proposal to solve the issue of climate change.103 Ultimately, it attempts to
predict actions based on an equation of probabilities.104
Finally, realist political theory holds that “the political process is
governed by the politician’s pursuit of self-interest in order to ensure his
political survival.”105 Under this theory, politics can be explained simply
as the constant effort by lawmakers to win reelection.106 That is, if most
of a legislator’s constituency is religious, the legislator will logically
prefer laws that benefit religious practice.107 If an interest group offers to
spend an incredibly large sum of money to help the lawmaker win
reelection in exchange for a vote on a piece of legislation, the lawmaker
is logically going to agree.108 Even scholars arguing for the legislative
ability to create religious exemptions should notice the cause of concern
created by legislative preference always going to majority-followed
religions.109
By understanding these prevailing theories of the political process,
lobbying makes considerably more sense. If a lawmaker applies these
three notions of political theory to their work, logically they will pass, or
at the very least support, laws that their constituents agree with.110 By the
same token, they will oppose ideas antithetical to their constituents.111
This is where lobbying comes in, particularly because voters are not

100. See ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 1 (1991).
101. See generally Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, It Takes Two: An Explanation of the
Democratic Peace, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1, 1–10 (2004) (explaining peace treaties using game
theory).
102. Steven J. Brams, Game Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis, PLUS MAG. (Jan. 1,
2001), https://plus.maths.org/content/game-theory-and-cuban-missile-crisis [https://perma.cc/
8W3V-QZZL] (explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis using game theory).
103. See generally Peter John Wood, Climate Change and Game Theory: A Mathematical
Survey, 1219 ECOLOGICAL ECON. REV. 153 (2011) (explaining climate change policies using
game theory).
104. MYERSON, supra note 100, at 1–4.
105. SETTY, supra note 90.
106. See id. at 40–41.
107. Cf. id. at 40 (arguing that the interest of subordinate groups can only be furthered if
they coexist with the interest of the lawmaker).
108. See id.
109. See Zoë Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative Process
Theory of Statutory Exemptions for Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133, 177 (2011).
110. See id.
111. See id.
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perfectly informed.112 Interest groups represent the ideas of their
members.113 They also could spend nearly unlimited capital in their
efforts to sway legislation or public opinion.114 Applying these political
theories to interest groups, it logically follows that politicians will act in
their own interest, following the will of the governed, in an equation
designed to increase the chance of political survival.115
C. A Background on Other First Amendment Jurisprudence
This section will evaluate some important doctrines of First
Amendment jurisprudence. It will begin with a discussion of the chilling
effect doctrine and follow with a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine.
In doing so, it is also important to consider the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, which prohibits the government from recognizing
an official religion.116 Also prohibited under the First Amendment is the
endorsement of a religious idea or the prevention of any religious idea,117
however, some jurists, like Antonin Scalia, would disagree.118 Ultimately,
when ruling on a First Amendment question, “the Court will engage in a
form of balancing analysis, and its jurisprudence suggests that the
balancing will favor the government.”119
1.

The Chilling Effect Doctrine

The chilling effect doctrine finds its roots in a dissenting opinion
authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren.120 Warren wrote, “[T]he fear of
the censor by the composer of ideas acts as a substantial deterrent to the
creation of new thoughts.”121 Through this idea, the Court would find

112. See Downs, supra note 97, at 139.
113. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (prohibiting employers
from preventing their employees to unionize). Unions are among the most common interest
groups and are a great example of an interest group representing its members directly.
114. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(holding that business entities can spend unlimited sums to influence elections).
115. See SETTY, supra note 90, at 40–41.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
117. See generally Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)
(holding that the city allowing a private party to display a cross in a public space was not an
“endorsement” that would invalidate the action under the First Amendment).
118. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAW. L. REV.
449, 461 (2000).
119. Zoë Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows: Religious Interest Groups in the Legislative
Process, 64 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1097 (2015).
120. See Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1961) (Warren, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 75.

2019]

THE REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS LOBBYISTS

349

ways to apply a restriction on laws that deterred, or chilled, protected
expression.122 The chilling effect doctrine is comprised of two substantial
points. First, there must be an actual chilling.123 Second, if a chilling
exists, then courts must apply a strict scrutiny analysis.124 The Court has
held that “where there is no concrete evidence of a chilling effect, it is for
the court to evaluate the likelihood of [a] chilling effect under the
circumstances, and determine whether the risk involved is justified.”125
The Court has also stated that “perfect clarity and precise guidance have
never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive
activity.”126
The chilling effect doctrine should be the governing constitutional
principle in lobbying regulations, and states should avoid chilling
protected speech and religious practice. However, there is clearly a
compelling governmental interest in promoting public transparency to
governmental dealings,127 as is required for a law to pass strict scrutiny.128
The laws in question must also be narrowly tailored or the least restrictive
means possible to achieve the governmental interest.129 This Note will
analyze lobbying registration laws and apply the strict scrutiny analysis
and the chilling effect doctrine to them.
2.

The Overbreadth Doctrine

The overbreadth doctrine regulates vagueness in laws that deal
specifically with protected rights such as free speech and religious

122. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010).
123. See Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70–73, 78 (1976) (ruling that
because a zoning ordinance did not sufficiently deter the production or sale of adult movies, no
actual chilling existed).
124. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 72–73 (1981). The strict
scrutiny balancing test calls for a compelling governmental interest and that the law in question
must be narrowly tailored, or the least restrictive means possible of achieving the governmental
interest. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“The essence of all that has
been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”).
125. Australia/E. U.S.A. Shipping Conference v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 807, 811
(D.C. 1982), vacating as moot and remanded, No. 82-1516, 82-1683, 1986 WL 1165605
(D.D.C. Cir. Aug. 27, 1986) (emphasis added).
126. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989).
127. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
128. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339–40 (2003) (holding that a school
admissions policy had sufficiently overcome strict scrutiny when applying the balancing test).
129. Id.

350

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:333

expression.130 “According to our First Amendment overbreadth doctrine,
a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected
speech.”131 Under this doctrine, laws can be found unconstitutional if they
prohibit too much protected speech.132 However, in direct application to
lobbying disclosure rules for religious organizations, the overbreadth
doctrine does not prohibit states from exerting the same regulations on
religious groups that it would to non-religious groups.
This idea can be clearly seen in an opinion written by the Connecticut
Citizen’s Ethics Advisory Commission, which provides that “[w]hat
determines whether [an entity] . . . is lobbying is its intent in furnishing
the information. If it is for the purpose of influencing legislative [or
administrative] action, it is lobbying. Conversely, if it is not for the
purpose of influencing legislative [or administrative] action, it is not
lobbying.”133 The opinion went on to state that, although the entity “is the
best judge of its intent in providing information[,] . . . [i]ntent . . . can be
manifested objectively in a number of ways.”134 Under this precedent, the
Connecticut Office of State Ethics (Connecticut OSE) is qualified to
review protected speech in the context of a compelling governmental
interest.135 The Connecticut OSE already reviews various specific factual
circumstances in their application to the Code of Ethics.136 Other states
should apply the same logic to the dealings of religious groups in the
political process and require religious groups to register with their
governing bodies to promote transparency for the voters.
D. Intersectionality of These Ideas in Religious Lobbying
In applying all three of these complex ideas to the practice of religious
lobbying in America, the involvement of religion in the political process
will make more sense. Under the argued foundation of religion, humans
inherently apply our own desires to the divine;137 that is, our desires
become God’s desires.138 Politics can be described simply as the result of
130. See generally Recent Case, Overbreadth Doctrine, 122 HARV. L. REV. 385, 385–88
(2008) (noting that under the overbreadth doctrine, statutes can be found “void for vagueness”).
131. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. Conn. St. Ethics Comm’n, Advisory Opinion No. 78-13 (Aug. 4, 1978).
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See Conn. St. Ethics Comm’n, Advisory Opinion No. 1994-11 (1994); see also Conn.
St. Ethics Comm’n, Advisory Opinion No. 2009-6 (July 23, 2009).
137. See supra Section I.A.
138. See ASLAN, supra note 59, at xii.
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an equation—the consent of the governed coupled with their imperfect
knowledge, added to the desires of interest groups with deep pockets;
calculating this should give a politician an indication of the best chance
for political survival (i.e., reelection).139
This exact scenario can be seen clearly in the actions of now-Senator
Richard Blumenthal when he was the Attorney General of Connecticut.140
In 2009, the Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation (“the
Church”) filed a federal lawsuit against officials of the Connecticut
OSE.141 The Church alleged that the method by which all lobbying in the
state of Connecticut is regulated was restrictive to the point of creating a
chilling effect on their constitutionally protected religious expression.142
The lawsuit was in response to an OSE investigation into the actions of
the Church.143 Particularly, the Church spent several days, and a large
sum of money, to rally its members against “Raised Bill 1098” in March
of 2009.144
The Church alleged the proposed legislation was
unconstitutional and wanted to challenge it before it ever became law.145
It did just that by using its website and churches, rallying members of the
Diocese, and bussing them to Hartford for a protest.146 This prompted an
evaluation from the OSE.147
The evaluation was based on Connecticut state law that regulates
lobbyists.148 It was clear, based on the size of the rally, that the Church
had spent enough money, in an admitted attempt to influence legislation,

139. See supra Sections I.A–C.
140. See generally Op. Att’y Gen. 2009-006 (June 30, 2009), 2009 WL 1904432 (Conn.
A.G.) [hereinafter Opinion Letter] (arguing that the enforcement of the ethics code upon a
religious group violated the first amendment).
141. See generally Complaint, Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Jones, No.
3:09-CV-00851, 2009 WL 4313525 (D. Conn. 2009) [hereinafter Complaint] (litigating the
enforcement of the ethics code upon the Bridgeport church).
142. See id. ¶ 1.
143. Id.
144. Id. ¶ 2 (arguing that Raised Bill 1098 attempted to create an oversight board of
laypeople to regulate the Catholic church in Connecticut); see Opinion Letter, supra note 140,
at *1; see also An Act Modifying Corporate Laws Relating to Certain Religious Corporations,
S.B. 1098, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009), http://www.cga.ct.gov/
2009/TOB/S/2009SB-01098-R00-SB.htm [https://perma.cc/XPY3-B5M4].
145. See Complaint, supra note 141, ¶¶ 1–2.
146. Id. ¶ 23; see also Christine Stuart, Catholic Church Sues State Over Lobbying
Provision, CT NEWS JUNKIE (May 29, 2009, 9:20 PM), https://www.ctnewsjunkie.com/
archives/entry/catholic_church_sues_state_over_lobbying_provision [https://perma.cc/3QQGP983].
147. Complaint, supra note 141, ¶¶ 6, 37.
148. Id.
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to require lobbyist registration under the Code of Ethics.149 The Church
responded with a lawsuit claiming that the lobbyist registration and
disclosure requirements violated its constitutional right to free exercise
under the First Amendment.150 The Attorney General agreed with the
Church and informed the OSE that the registration and disclosure
requirements being applied were, in his opinion, constitutionally
questionable.151 He expressed his concern by writing an opinion that
seriously misapplied the First Amendment,152 and argued for an
exemption to the code that would be popular, but would dilute
transparency.153 Blumenthal insisted OSE and the legislature update the
definition of “expenditure” in the Connecticut Code of Ethics.154
The Attorney General’s letter contended that the legislation be
changed to exclude costs of transportation and communications by a group
intended for its members.155 The letter, which stated the Attorney
General’s concerns, prompted the OSE to propose several legislative
changes.156 Among them is the amendment to the definition of
“expenditure” under the Code of Ethics.157
Ultimately, the Bridgeport case was voluntarily withdrawn because
the OSE, considering the Attorney General’s letter, decided not to pursue
enforcement action.158 The letter issued by Attorney General Blumenthal

149. Id.; see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-94 (2018) (noting that the dollar amount to require
registration was raised from $2,000 to $3,000 in 2016); see also An Act Amending the Code of
Ethics for Lobbyists to Redefine “Expenditure” and Raise the Threshold for Lobbyist
Registration, 2015 Conn. Pub. Acts. 15-15 (Reg. Sess.).
150. See generally Complaint, supra note 141, ¶¶ 1–2 (alleging that enforcement of the
ethics code violated the church’s first amendment rights).
151. See Opinion Letter, supra note 140, at *3.
152. Attorney General Blumenthal argued that the existence of a chilling effect was
facially intolerable, completely ignoring decades of precedent on the very issue, and the
requirement for a strict scrutiny analysis. See id.
153. See id. at *4 (noting that “[t]he legislature should consider clarifying the scope of
this exemption” to include the expenditure made by Bridgeport).
154. Id.
155. Opinion Letter, supra note 140, at *2; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-91(6)(B)–(C) (2018).
Section C reflects the change the Attorney General argued for in his opinion letter. Id.
156. See An Act Amending the Code of Ethics for Lobbyists to Redefine
“Expenditure” and Raise the Threshold for Lobbyist Registration, 2015 Conn. Pub. Acts. 15-15
(Reg. Sess.).
157. § 1-91(6).
158. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Jones,
No. 3:09-cv-00851, 2009 (D. Conn. July 2, 2009).
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created ambiguity in the enforceability of the law that must be clarified.159
This ambiguity also has the potential to lead to more lawsuits.
Through this complex and legally questionable process, Blumenthal
saw that the Church was using its desires, and applying them to the divine
by quite literally preaching them from the pulpit.160 Church members
rallied, showing him their numbers and power, along with their political
will.161 Blumenthal responded with a letter that misapplied constitutional
law in a clear attempt to appease the church.162 Applying the political
theory principles previously demonstrated to this action,163 Mr.
Blumenthal acted to preserve his own self-interest.164 Christians make up
seventy percent of Connecticut, and more specifically, Catholics make up
thirty-three percent of the state.165 The next year, Attorney General
Blumenthal got a promotion and became United States Senator
Blumenthal.166 He took fifty-five percent of the votes in the state,167 and
carried Hartford, as well as the New York City suburb area of Connecticut
where Bridgeport sits.168 While no polling data on the specific religious
preferences of Blumenthal voters exists from the 2010 election, a logical
conclusion is that Blumenthal’s 2009 opinion aided his political survival,
and in this case, helped him achieve a position on a much larger stage.169
Now that a definition of religion, the political process, and the law
has been demonstrated in the real world of political happenings, this Note
159. See Opinion Letter, supra note 140, at *3 (calling a chilling effect facially intolerable
and alleging that the registration and disclosure requirements in the Code of Ethics violated the
church’s right to religious expression).
160. See Complaint, supra note 141, ¶ 20.
161. See generally id.
162. See generally Opinion Letter, supra note 140 (arguing that the mere existence of
chilling effect was enough to make the application of the law intolerable).
163. See supra Section I.C.
164. See supra Section I.B; see also Setty, supra note 90 (explaining political realism
theory and why politicians make the decisions they make).
165. Adults in Connecticut, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewforum.org/religiouslandscape-study/state/connecticut/ [https://perma.cc/4EQE-7UNG].
166. See David M. Halbfinger, Blumenthal Wins in Connecticut to Take Dodd’s Seat, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/nyregion/03ctsen.html
[https://perma.cc/QPM3-YFTV].
167. Katie Thomas, Election 2010: Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
elections/2010/results/connecticut.html [https://perma.cc/NX3A-5Q58].
168. See Election 2010: Connecticut Senate Exit Polls, N.Y. TIMES (2010)
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2010/results/senate/exit-polls.html#connecticut
[https://perma.cc/ZV8Q-WFAS] (demonstrating that Blumenthal won in both urban and
suburban areas of the state, which would include Hartford and the suburban area where
Bridgeport sits).
169. See Halbfinger, supra note 166.
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argues that the regulation of religious lobbyists in an identical way to nonreligious lobbyists is the most preferential legal treatment.
II. THE THREE DIVISIONS OF LOBBYING REGULATION
Religious liberties are not compromised when religious organizations
are held to the same standard as their secular counterparts regarding
lobbying regulations. Equal application of the law is the most favorable
way to handle the complex constitutional questions raised by the issue
because it avoids the possibility of an “endorsement” challenge.170 Some
states have explicitly exempted certain religious lobbying activities that
may be permissible under the First Amendment from their definition of
“lobbying.”171 However, even these permissible laws172 are suboptimal.
The United States Supreme Court has created a test for evaluating
establishment clause claims to determine whether the state in question has
given preferential treatment to religion.173 This test is essentially a test of
endorsement,174 which in this context means “an expression or
demonstration of approval or support.”175 The Court also equates this test
with “promotion” or “favoritism.”176
So, in determining the
constitutionality of these lobbying laws, one should look to the primary
purpose and effect of the law.177 In the application of this endorsement
test, an endorsement exists when a reasonable observer would infer
promotion or favoritism of religious expression by the government.178
The Court has also made clear that “neutral government policies that

170. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995).
“Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it . . . is . . . publicly
announced and open to all on equal terms.” Id. at 770.
171. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-250(a)(17) (2018) (exempting religious
communications not related to legislative or executive action from being considered lobbying).
172. See generally Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 769–70 (holding that the city allowing a
private party to display a cross in a public space was not an “endorsement” that would invalidate
the action under the First Amendment).
173. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). “Three such tests may be gleaned
from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Id. (citations omitted).
174. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 763 (noting that the test petitioners asked for is not a test
of endorsement at all, and certainly is not the endorsement test that Court had developed).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.
178. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 763–64.
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happen to benefit religion” do not equate to endorsement, and thus are not
in violation of the Establishment Clause.179
A. Inherently Problematic Laws
Some states have put forth laws that are facially unconstitutional.180
These laws grant an express benefit to religious speech that is not granted
to non-religious speech and thus would not stand up to the endorsement
test.181 For example, the South Carolina law discussed previously is the
most egregious.182 It not only exempts protected religious activity, like
defending the right of its members to practice whatever doctrine they
practice, but also protects against anything “considered to have an adverse
effect upon the moral welfare of the membership of the church.”183 This
law is problematic for several reasons.
Most notably, it clearly favors religious speech over non-religious
speech, and the text facially gives preferential treatment to those
representing a church.184 Under the endorsement test, this can be seen
evidently as promoting, favoring, or endorsing religious activity.185 This
is problematic because non-religious organizations may also have strong
moral convictions deriving from something other than religion.186 If the
purpose of the exemption is to allow one to defend “moral welfare,” it
does so erroneously and in violation of the Establishment Clause.187
While problems with the South Carolina law abound, creating an
effective solution is complicated. First, the issue has never been raised to
the regulatory body in South Carolina.188 When asked about the issue, the
director of the South Carolina Ethics Commission responded, “The SC
Ethics Commission has not encountered a circumstance where an
individual claimed a registration exemption for serving in a position that

179. Id. at 754, 769–70.
180. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
181. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.
182. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f) (2018).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995).
186. See generally STEVE CIRRONE, SECULAR MORALITY: RHETORIC AND READER
(2015) (demonstrating the ability to make a moral argument without adherence to a religious
doctrine).
187. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
188. E-mail from Steven Hamm, Interim Chairman of the S. C. Ethics Comm’n, to
Nicholas Smith (Nov. 16, 2017, 11:48 AM) (on file with author).
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represents any established church.”189 He went on to clarify that the
provisions in the code that restrict gifts on lawmakers would still apply to
them.190 Thus, even lobbyists covered by this exemption would not be
able to bribe legislators.191 Since this law has never been defined further
by the ethics commission in an advisory or formal opinion, it has never
been appealed to the Court, and thus has been allowed to stand because of
its obscure status.192
However, it still creates an inherent problem. Specifically, in South
Carolina, lobbyists must pay an annual nonrefundable fee of one hundred
dollars, and file the legislative or executive action they are rendering
service to with the State Ethics Commission.193 They must also disclose
their legal name, permanent address, phone number, and a list of all
legislative or executive action they expect to lobby each year.194 The way
the law is written gives religious lobbyists an advantage over their secular
counterparts by freeing up their time and saving them one hundred dollars
a year.195
Further, in South Carolina, “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory
construction is that words used therein must be given their plain and
ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit
or expand its operation.”196 In application to the law in question, the plain
and ordinary meaning of a church is a Christian place of worship.197 The
word church does not include a synagogue, mosque, or temple,198 and
under South Carolinian precedent, it is improper to expand the plain
meaning of the word.199 While other jurisdictions may have settled this

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-20(A) (2018).
194. § 2-17-20(B).
195. See § 2-17-20(A); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f) (2018) (“[Exempting]
a person who represents any established church solely for the purpose of protecting the rights
of the membership . . . or . . . the doctrines of the church or on matters considered to have an
adverse effect upon the moral welfare of the membership of the church [from lobbyist
registration].”).
196. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp. v. Leatherman, 420 S.E.2d 843, 846 (S.C. 1992).
197. Church,
ENGLISH
OXFORD
LIVING
DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/church [https://perma.cc/MJQ9-8DKZ].
198. See id.
199. See Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., 420 S.E.2d at 846. “In construing statutes, we seek to
effectuate legislative intent. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that words used
therein must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced
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definitional issue,200 it has not been remedied in South Carolina. Thus,
not only does the lobbying code favor religious speech over non-religious
speech, it more accurately favors Christian speech over non-Christian
speech. In applying the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has made
clear that states cannot “pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another.”201
The ethics code in South Carolina is facially invalid under every part
of the above statement.202 It favors Christianity over non-Christian
religions, and even if a court were to reject that contention, it still favors
religious speech over non-religious speech and, for that reason, should be
struck down.203 Even if this law has never been applied to an actual event,
it still presents to a reasonable observer that South Carolina
unconstitutionally favors religious speech over non-religious speech.204 It
is also plausible that, since the South Carolina Ethics Commission—the
only regulatory body in the state—has never heard this issue,205 religious
lobbyists are simply falling through the cracks of enforcement. That is,
religious lobbyists could be acting within the law and not drawing
attention to themselves. Thus, the Commission would not have reason to
evaluate the issue because it is happening outside the scope of its vision.
Further, several states include language in their lobbying codes that
exempts representatives of a “bona fide” religious organization.206 These
laws create a conundrum for regulatory bodies by making it their duty to
determine what is and is not a religious organization.207 This task is so

construction to limit or expand its operation.” Id. This means that the lobbying statute should
be defined with its plain and ordinary meaning. See id.
200. See Islamic Soc’y of Basking Ridge v. Twp. of Bernards, 226 F. Supp. 3d 320, 329–
30, 342 (D.N.J. 2016) (holding that church can be construed to refer to non-Christian religions).
201. Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
202. Compare id. (holding that a law is invalid if it favors one religion over another), with
S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f) (2018) (providing an exemption specifically for Christian
organizations).
203. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that laws favoring
religion, or one religion over another, are unconstitutional).
204. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 764–65 (1995)
(explaining that governmental action which favors religious expression is unconstitutional); see
also S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f) (2018).
205. See E-mail from Steven Hamm, supra note 188.
206. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 86300(c) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN. GEN.
PROVIS. § 5-702(b)(1)(iii) (West 2018); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13A06(11) (2018); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 36-11-102(14)(b)(vi) (West 2018).
207. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (holding that a very small congregation practicing the Santeria faith with a sincerely
held belief was a religion and warranted protection).
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complicated that it “has been a source of great controversy for courts and
commentators.”208 The laws requiring local boards to determine what is
and what is not religious are improper because of the complex nature of
determining what constitutes a religion.209 The test by which courts
determine what constitutes a religious belief is quite complicated.210
Effectively, courts must determine that the belief in question is “sincerely
held” and that it is in the registrants’ “own scheme of things” religious.211
This necessarily subjective test could result in the regulatory body
spending an inordinate amount of time determining which religious
groups are in fact “bona fide.”
One alternative to this subjective test would be to use the tax status
of a religious group as the justification for their lobbying exemption.212
However, this too presents serious concerns. For instance, one needs to
look no further than John Oliver and his now-closed church, Our Lady of
Perpetual Exemption.213 John Oliver is a political satirist with a television
program on HBO.214 His church was located in his studio, and existed to
mock televangelism.215 This church was created—through the process of
filing the correct paperwork with the Internal Revenue Service to establish
a tax-exempt church—in order to “expose televangelists.”216 According
to Oliver, the entire process was “disturbingly easy.”217 This means that
any organization like Home Box Office, the network that produces
Oliver’s show, could easily forgo the normal disclosure requirement by
208. Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1018 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
209. See Rhett B. Larson, Holy Water and Human Rights: Indigenous Peoples’ ReligiousRights Claims to Water Resources, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 81, 104 (2011) (noting that it
is complicated to define religion in the context of civil rights). This idea can be similarly applied
to the complicated task that regulatory bodies would have in defining what is and is not religious
in the context of lobbying.
210. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176, 185 (1965) (explaining that
religiously neutral language is important because rigid definitions would likely exclude some
sincerely held religious beliefs).
211. Id. at 185.
212. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).
213. Laura Bradley, Praise Be to John Oliver, Who Started a Church Just to Expose
Televangelists, SLATE (Aug. 17, 2015, 10:57 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/
2015/08/17/john_oliver_televangelism_last_week_tonight_creates_a_church_to_hilariously.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/P2MQ-QGAP].
214. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, About, HBO, https://www.hbo.com/last-weektonight-with-john-oliver [https://perma.cc/3XHW-FXH3].
215. See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, Televangelists: Last Week Tonight with
John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (Aug. 16, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=7y1xJAVZxXg.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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simply starting a legally recognizable church to gain access to a relaxed
standard.218 This is clearly not in the best interest of the state or the people.
This Note proposes that states should remove religious exemptions
from their laws altogether. This would increase transparency for voters,
which is, after all, the purpose of lobbying codes.219 Such action would
solve the issue of determining who can and cannot use the exemption
based on their religiousness, and it would also help circumvent the First
Amendment issue altogether.
B. Neutral Provisions
Some states have religious exemptions that do not inherently create a
problem with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, but are
still unnecessary.220 For example, Utah’s lobbying code provides that
religious representatives are not lobbyists if they act “solely for the
purpose of protecting the right to practice the religious doctrines of the
church.”221 The law goes on to clarify that a religious actor would regain
lobbyist status, and thus be required to register as a lobbyist and make
disclosures, if “the individual or church makes an expenditure that confers
a benefit on a public official.”222
This language seemingly attempts to balance First Amendment
concerns with lobbying regulation; however, it presents a possible
endorsement issue under the Lemon test.223 To explain, one must consider
lobbying that does not confer a benefit on a public official. Lobbyists
often take actions that are designed to benefit only their principal.224
These strategies do not facially confer a benefit on anyone other than the

218. See id.
219. See Free Mkt. Found. v. Reisman, 573 F. Supp. 2d 952, 956 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (noting
that reporting requirements exist to promote transparency in lobbying).
220. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-250 (2018) (exempting only communications not
related to legislative or executive action).
221. UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-102(14)(b)(vi) (West 2018).
222. See id.
223. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–14 (1971) (holding that laws must have
secular purposes or primary effects that neither advance nor inhibit religion and must not create
excessive entanglement between the government and religion).
224. See generally Tamasin Cave & Andy Rowell, The Truth About Lobbying: 10 Ways
Big Business Controls Government, GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2014, 1:45 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/mar/12/lobbying-10-ways-corprations-influencegovernment [https://perma.cc/G8KL-EVEU] (explaining the difference between lobbyists and
the government in the United Kingdom).
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business behind the lobbying,225 and these strategies include actions such
as presenting a position to the legislature.226 This does not necessarily
“benefit” the members of the legislature, but it could sway their votes on
a bill that would benefit the lobbyist principal, such as a new tax that
would cost the principal money. Therefore, even if Utah adds lobbying
regulations for religious organizations that directly confer a benefit on a
legislator or executive office, the legislature still leaves the door open for
lobbying activity that is not directly covered by the law.
Further, Utah does not have a provision in its lobbying code that
regulates grassroots lobbying.227 Grassroots lobbying, or indirect
lobbying, is an attempt to affect legislative or executive action by swaying
public opinion, or by having the public attempt to affect legislative or
executive action.228 This trend of lobbying has become increasingly
popular and is encompassed by most states’ lobbying regulations.229
Specifically, “[twenty-two states] explicitly define lobbying as direct and
indirect communication with public officials, and [fourteen states] broadly
define lobbying as any attempt to influence public officials.”230 This
provides even more leeway for religious groups, as they are uniquely
situated to directly communicate with their members on a regular basis.231
225. See Theodoric Meyer & Marianne Levine, Walsh Moves to FP1, POLITICO:
INFLUENCE (Nov. 14, 2018, 3:17 PM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politicoinfluence/2018/11/14/walsh-moves-to-fp1-413310 [https://perma.cc/AP2A-H9DN] (indicating
that a lobbying coalition aims to present research to congress, presumably for the benefit of their
principal).
226. See id. (noting that lobbyists aim to educate Congress on a subject that will save
Congress the time of researching this material independently, such as information regarding
quantum research and development).
227. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-102(14) (West 2018).
228. See HOFRENNING, supra note 32, at 54–55.
229. See Mayer, supra note 35, at 561; see also Edward Walker, How Grassroots
Lobbying Consultants Are Reshaping Public Participation in Policy Battles, SCHOLARS
STRATEGY NETWORK (May 2, 2014), https://scholars.org/brief/how-grassroots-lobbyingconsultants-are-reshaping-public-participation-policy-battles [https://perma.cc/XPQ3-Y5AA]
(noting that grassroots lobbying has become a popular tool—not just for populist groups, but
for Fortune 500 companies as well).
230. JEFFREY MILYO, MOWING DOWN THE GRASSROOTS: HOW GRASSROOTS LOBBYING
DISCLOSURE SUPPRESSES POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, INST. FOR JUST. 8 (April 2010)
(emphasis
omitted),
https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/mowing_down_thegrassroots.pdf [https://perma.cc/AS7S-SKKK]. These states include Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming. Id.
231. Compare
Attendance
at
Religious
Services,
PEW
RES.
CTR.,
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/attendance-at-religious-services/
[https://perma.cc/955S-9QYZ] (finding that approximately 69% of Americans attend a religious
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They can therefore encourage their congregants to talk to their friends,
write to their members of Congress, or engage in a whole host of other
actions that could sway public opinion, and thus affect the lawmaking
process without ever conferring a benefit on a public official.232
States without grassroots lobbying provisions in their codes should
add such a provision to increase transparency, as this method of lobbying
has become increasingly popular.233 However, the logical application of
the endorsement doctrine still applies to states with neutral provisions,
with or without grassroots provisions.234 Continuing with the Utah
example, and encompassing all laws with similar language, the lobbying
provision in question exists to allow religious groups to defend their
constitutionally protected status.235 That is, they can only act in a way that
defends their free exercise of religion.236 The nature of this law, and the
application of the endorsement test, is complicated.237 On one hand, the
law clearly gives religious groups a means to impact the lawmaking
process without registering as lobbyists, which their secular counterparts
do not receive.238 On the other hand, it is unclear how this benefit could
even possibly be applied to secular organizations.239 The right to lobby,
unhindered, in defense of free-exercise makes sense.

service either once a month and a few times a year), with Aaron Smith et al., The Current State
of Civic Engagement in America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 1, 2009),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2009/09/01/the-current-state-of-civic-engagement-in-america/
[https://perma.cc/NY4L-SM2P] (demonstrating that only about 12% of Americans participated
in a political rally or speech in a year’s time).
232. See Kelly S. Shoop, If You Are a Good Christian You Have No Business Voting for
This Candidate: Church Sponsored Political Activity in Federal Elections, 83 WASH. U. L.Q.
1927, 1939 (noting that religious groups act to mobilize voters and sway opinion); see also,
Hunter Schwarz, How Much Influence Can a Church Have Over Its Members’ Political Beliefs?
A Mormon Case Study., WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2015/02/26/how-much-influence-can-a-church-have-over-its-members-politicalbeliefs-a-mormon-case-study/?utm_term=.c76afc4d7929 [https://perma.cc/TDQ5-2Y4F].
233. See generally Milyo, supra note 230 (noting an increase in grassroots lobbying and
its regulation).
234. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (noting that laws that create an
“‘excessive government[al] entanglement with religion’” are unconstitutional even if they are
drafted neutrally and with a secular purpose (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970))).
235. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-102(14)(b)(vi) (West 2018).
236. See, e.g., id.
237. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 755 (1995); see
also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.
238. See § 36-11-102(14)(b)(vi).
239. The application to non-religious counterparts is unclear because the law specifies
defense of religious doctrine, which non-religious groups inherently do not have.
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However, laws that give a benefit to religious groups are still not the
most preferential outcome for these regulations. The ability to freely
exercise one’s religion is well defined and defended by the First
Amendment and subsequent jurisprudence.240 The inclusion of these
provisions in lobbying regulations only serves to further complicate the
duties of the regulatory bodies.241
For example, consider this hypothetical: if the Lieutenant Governor
in Utah determined that a religious organization was spending money to
do research about a proposed law, and it was sharing that research with
the legislature, the Lieutenant Governor could justifiably bring an
enforcement action.242 Through this enforcement action, the office learns
that the religious organization in question was researching the effect of a
proposed bill concerning religious symbols on public land. The religious
organization was simply concerned that the cross it has on display at the
corner of its driveway and the public highway would be forbidden.
Therefore, it decided to undergo considerable legal research into the
proximity to a public road in which the state owns the land, and where
precisely their property line was. If it shares this research with the
legislature is it “confer[ring] a benefit on a public official?”243 That would
presumably be up to the Lieutenant Governor in Utah.244 These actions
may not be considered a benefit, but surely the legislature gains something
out of it. If the religious organization has already done the groundwork to
establish what the law means and how it affects roadside property, then
the legislature is free from doing the same research. Thus, it has received
the benefit of time and resources. However, the lobbying code is unclear
as to whether this is what the legislature of Utah intended the term
“benefit” to mean.245 The uncertainty of this law’s application is
concerning, particularly in consideration of the First Amendment.
The only example of a religious exemption in a lobbying code that
does not fundamentally raise First Amendment concerns is that found in

240. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 544–47 (1993) (ruling on free exercise when applied to specific rituals).
241. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
242. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-404 (West 2018) (assigning the duty of appointing
administrative law judges and the procedures for lobbying licenses to the Lieutenant Governor
to enforce lobbying regulations).
243. See § 36-11-102(14)(b)(vi).
244. See § 36-11-404.
245. See § 36-11-102. The word “benefit” is not defined in the statute, thus discerning
what the legislature intended it to mean is very difficult, and possibly a matter left completely
up to interpretation. See id.

2019]

THE REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS LOBBYISTS

363

North Carolina’s lobbying code.246
The state’s code exempts
“communications or activities as part of a business, civic, religious,
fraternal, personal, or commercial relationship which is not connected to
legislative or executive action, or both.”247 This law, while probably
unnecessary, is broad enough to likely be permissible under any
application of First Amendment jurisprudence.248 It is wide-ranging and
allows exemptions for religious and non-religious institutions equally, and
neither restricts nor favors any speech.249 While the logic of this provision
is sound, in application, it is useless. It essentially says, lobbying does not
include things that are not lobbying. The protection of the North Carolina
exemption, as well as similar exemptions in other states, is already
conferred in the right of association.250
Through all these “neutral provisions” there exists a series of
unconstitutional favoritism or utter redundancies that do nothing for the
state.251 These facially neutral lobbying provisions are not the best way
for states to address religious lobbying, although, they are significantly
better than the facially unconstitutional provisions.252
Despite the efforts to provide the protections required by the First
Amendment, these states with religious exemptions have created a
disparity in the constitutional application of their laws.253 Only one court
has ever observed this issue regarding lobbying, finding an Illinois
lobbying statute invalid and issuing a restraining order.254 Upon further
review, the White court struck down the law because its scheme of billing
charged lobbyists more money than was required to sufficiently manage
the regulation process.255 The court suggested that the legislature would
amend the law, and thus, they would not need to rule on, via the

246. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-250(a)(17) (2018).
247. Id.
248. See supra Section I.C.
249. See § 163A-250(a)(17); see also supra Section I.C.
250. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622–23 (1984).
251. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
252. See supra Section II.A.
253. See sources cited supra note 10.
254. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. White, No. 09 C 7706, 2009 WL 5166231, at *4–
5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2009) [hereinafter White I]; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. White,
692 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2010) [hereinafter White II] (ruling that the lobbying law in
Illinois violated the First Amendment by charging lobbyists more than was required to operate
the registration process). Under this ruling, the court declined to address whether the religious
exemption was a violation of the First Amendment because the law was already found to be
unconstitutional for less pervasive reasons. Id.
255. See White I, 2009 WL 5166231, at *4.
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endorsement test, whether religious exemptions were a violation of the
Establishment Clause.256 To date, the law still has a religious
exemption.257 Thus, no court has ever ruled on the constitutionality of a
religious exemption to a lobbying code. However, under the endorsement
test, any of the laws containing religious exemptions would not likely be
upheld.258
C. Laws with No Mention of Religion
Forty-one states have lobbying codes with no mention of religious
activity.259 While those states may have some problems in their lobbying
codes,260 these issues are outside the scope of this Note. States included
in Subparts A and B of Part II should consider modeling their lobbying
regulations after the states included in this Section to avoid any First
Amendment violations.
Specifically, states looking to provide
exemptions for certain groups should look to Connecticut for guidance on
how to encompass group communication and transportation in their
laws.261 Although Connecticut arrived at this solution the wrong way,262
it is the best statutory solution to the issues this Note addresses.
III. REMEDYING THE LOBBYING DISPARITY
The solution that could best solve the issue of regulation for religious
lobbyists would be to treat all lobbyists equally under the law. The
application of this idea, however, may present complications. There are
serious issues to consider regarding a facially neutral law in its application
to religious lobbyists.263 These issues include not only constitutional

256. Cf. White II, 692 F. Supp. at 993. The court does not go into detail on how they
would evaluate the claim of an establishment clause violation, but they do decline to rule on the
issue in favor of “judicial economy.” See id.
257. See 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 170/3 (A)(7) (2018).
258. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1971) (ruling that laws creating “an
excessive government entanglement with religion” should be found unconstitutional (quoting
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970))); see also supra Section I.C.
259. See sources cited 2supra note 31.
260. See supra Section II.B (discussing neutral grassroots lobbying provisions); see also
Mayer, supra note 35, at 561.
261. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-91(6) (2018) (exempting some expenditures for all
organizations rather than exempting religious activity).
262. See supra Section I.D (arguing that the catalyst for this legislative change in
Connecticut was, at best, a clever political strategy by a senate hopeful).
263. See supra Sections II.A–B; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241–42
(holding that discriminatory intent must be demonstrated in order for a law to be deemed facially
neutral).
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concerns, such as whether the suggested regulation will chill religious
speech,264 but also the deeply complex challenge of motivating lawmakers
to change an unknown, but likely strongly supported, law.265
First, in addressing the complexity of reworking several states’
lobbying rules, it is important to emphasize that this is not a call for a
federal standard on lobbying that applies across all fifty states. The federal
government can treat lobbying however it desires. States have inherent
knowledge of what their needs are as well as what works best in their state.
That said, some uniformity in this regard would be preferential.266 While
there are unique differences across the country’s many lobbying
regulations, most of them make no mention of religious activity at all.267
This is the ideal way to deal with religious lobbyists; regulating them
identically to their secular counterparts.268
Critics of this idea argue that lobbying registration and disclosure
create an undue burden on religious bodies, thus chilling their free
speech.269 However, that is not the case. Under the chilling effect
doctrine, there must be an actual chilling before courts will apply the strict
scrutiny standard to evaluate whether the chilling is permissible.270 A
chilling exists when the law interferes with, or prevents, engagement in
protected expression.271 Lobbying is inherently political speech, which is
protected by the First Amendment.272 The Court has upheld lobbying
regulations as permissible.273 Therefore, claiming that regulation on
religious lobbyists creates a chilling of protected speech, but that lobbying

264. See supra Section II.C.1.
265. See supra Section I.B.
266. See Overview, supra note 7 (explaining that each state has a unique lobbying law
with key differences).
267. See generally States Define Lobbying, supra note 6.
268. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that regulating
religious and non-religious lobbyists equally would avoid a constitutional challenge under the
“Lemon Test” or other parts of First Amendment jurisprudence); see also supra Section I.C.
269. Complaint, supra note 141, ¶ 9 (arguing that a registration and reporting requirement
in the lobbying code, when applied to the church, chilled protected speech).
270. See supra Section I.C.
271. See Eric Lardiere, The Justiciability and Constitutionality of Political Intelligence
Gathering, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 976, 984–87 (1983) (noting that courts have applied the chilling
effect doctrine to government surveillance as well as prohibitive state action when it interferes
with or prohibits political engagement).
272. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419–20 (1989).
273. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983) (holding that
lobbying regulations do not violate the First Amendment).
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regulations in general do not, is problematic because this favoritism
creates an endorsement of religious speech.274
Admittedly, religious organizations would likely have the most
complex issues in determining what their ordinary course of business is
and what constitutes an effort to influence legislative or executive
action.275 That is, religious organizations spend a considerable amount of
time discussing social problems.276 There is certainly some overlap with
topics of a political connotation and, thus, under the law, some difficult
questions concerning what does and does not constitute lobbying.277 The
church’s argument accurately points out that the effort it would take to
determine if every message to congregants was in fact lobbying would be
crippling. Therefore, states should adapt their lobbying codes to exempt
communication with the groups’ own members, like the Connecticut Code
of Ethics for Lobbyists.278 Connecticut’s Code of Ethics exempts “any
expenditure made by any club, committee, partnership, organization,
business, union, association or corporation for the purpose of publishing
a newsletter or other release intended primarily for its members,
shareholders or employees, whether in written or electronic form or made
orally during a regularly noticed meeting.”279
If states were to adopt this type of language in their lobbying codes,
while removing the explicit religious exemptions, they could equalize the
playing field with regard to lobbying without creating an undue burden on
religious groups.280 Even though a ruling based on the chilling effect

274. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995).
275. See Complaint, supra note 141, ¶¶ 8–9 (stating that there are actions that were both
part of the church’s moral duty and required to be reported by the State Code of Ethics).
276. Id. ¶ 10.
[F]rom time to time, the Diocese’s religious mission compels it, the Bishop of the
Diocese, and pastors within the Diocese to take stands on legislation that concerns
the moral issues of the day and to urge parishioners to act on the basis of Church
teachings. The Diocese communicates these messages to its parishioners through
its website, in newsletters, at religious services, and through a variety of other
means.
Id.
277. See id. ¶¶ 8–9 (noting that the Church is compelled to take moral action, which may
also have a political connotation).
278. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-91(6) (2018) (exempting certain activities from being
considered an expenditure under the lobbying code, rather than exempting certain groups).
279. Id.
280. See id. The statute allows exemptions for any group communicating with its
members and for the transportation of its members. This allows religious groups—as well as
non-religious groups—protection from infringement on their daily communications with
members.
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doctrine should determine that standard, lobbying disclosure requirements
would not chill the political speech of religious groups.281 This type of
amendment would help prevent the issue even more. Doing so would
provide religious groups—as well as non-religious groups—the ability to
send messages to their members without it being considered a reportable
expenditure under the lobbying code.282 This is favorable to these groups
as well as the state because it would lighten the necessity for oversight in
certain aspects of weekly meetings or members-only communication.
Such an application of the law ideally mitigates the chilling concerns,
while maintaining a strong enough regulatory presence to provide the
necessary amount of transparency to voters.
Critics would also cite the overbreadth doctrine as a claim against an
ethics body’s ability to apply regulations to religious organizations.283
This argument is erroneous, however, because under the “First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it
prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech. The doctrine seeks to
strike a balance between competing social costs.”284 In weighing the
social costs of freedom of expression compared with government
transparency, the state should weigh the actual cost of each.285 To
illustrate, each state should evaluate the amount of protected speech their
lobbying disclosure requirement would prohibit. Each state should arrive
at the same conclusion: lobbying disclosures do not prohibit speech.286
Using Connecticut as an example, lobbying registration and disclosure are
not based on the content of the speech, but rather the intent of the action.287
The overbreadth doctrine is not disturbed by looking to the intent of
the speaker and requiring a minimal fee and a comprehensive disclosure
standard.288 Application of the overbreadth doctrine is only triggered
when a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited.289 Thus, this

281. See supra Section I.C.1.
282. See § 1-91(6).
283. E.g., Opinion Letter, supra note 140.
284. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (emphasis added).
285. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
521 (1993) (“It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly
tailored to advance that interest.”).
286. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550–51 (1983) (holding
that lobbying disclosure requirements do not violate the First Amendment).
287. See Conn. St. Ethics Comm’n, supra note 133.
288. Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 (explaining that a law is unconstitutional under the
overbreadth doctrine when it “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech”).
289. See id.
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argument regarding the overbreadth doctrine by critics fails the test of
legal application.
Ideally, in a world where lobbyists are spending millions of dollars
annually,290 states would have identical laws that regulate lobbying, which
would avoid creating unnecessary confusion and overburdening protected
speech.291 However, because of the complexities of the American system
of federalism and the individualized needs of each state, no two lobbying
laws are identical.292 While this creates ambiguity across the board for
lobbyists seeking to lobby in more than one state, it is likely not going to
be fixed by any simple solution. Lobbying codes must allow protected
speech and they must balance this idea with transparency.293
It therefore follows that the ideal solution is for states to adjust their
lobbying codes to include language that allows for the regulation of
religious lobbyists, while maintaining their own specialized needs and
refraining from overburdening protected speech.294 Facially neutral laws
that treat religious and non-religious lobbyists equally are the ideal way to
remedy this problem.295 Accordingly, states should amend their lobbying

290. See Top Spenders, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
top.php?showYear=2017&indexType=s [https://perma.cc/RS3F-L2JZ].
291. See Craig Holman & William Luneburg, Lobbying and Transparency: A
Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Reform, 1 INT. GROUPS & ADVOC. 75, 75–76 (2012).
292. See Lobbyist Registration Requirements, NCSL (Oct. 30, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-lobbyist-registration-requirements.aspx
[https://perma.cc/A9HZ-34EG].
293. See Charles Krauthammer, In Defense of Lobbying, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/28/AR2008022803232.html
[https://perma.cc/T4KR-EXLZ] (arguing that the First Amendment protects the right to lobby).
294. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-91(6) (2018).
“Expenditure” does not include (A) the payment of a registrant’s fee pursuant to
section 1-95, (B) any expenditure made by any club, committee, partnership,
organization, business, union, association or corporation for the purpose of
publishing a newsletter or other release intended primarily for its members,
shareholders or employees, whether in written or electronic form or made orally
during a regularly noticed meeting, (C) any expenditure made by any club,
committee, partnership, organization, business, union, association or corporation
for the purpose of transporting its members, shareholders or employees to or from
a specific site, where such members, shareholders or employees received no other
compensation or reimbursement for lobbying from such club, committee,
partnership, organization, business, union, association or corporation, or (D)
contributions, membership dues or other fees paid to associations, nonstock
corporations or tax-exempt organizations under Section 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of
the United States, as from time to time amended.
Id. (citation omitted).
295. See supra Part II.
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codes to remove any language specifically exempting religious
organizations from filing on any grounds and instead adopt a more neutral
policy such as the exemption in Connecticut.296 This type of exemption
necessarily allows for protected religious expression while still providing
adequate transparency for voters.
CONCLUSION
Just as the Paleolithic painters transcribed “The Sorcerer,” religious
lobbyists are channeling their perception of the divine. They are acting
on their beliefs, and as such, their view of God’s desires.297 This
inherently personal part of their lives is extremely important and should
be valued by society. Our protection of free speech and religious activity
is crucial.298
However, this does not inherently forgo the need for transparency in
government. Although many states have acted to create broad lobbying
exemptions for religious activity in defense of the First Amendment, what
these states have done is create an intrinsic violation therein.299 This
violation can be remedied without a complete overhaul of the lobbying
process. States should regulate lobbyists on an equal playing field.300
This equality will allow voters to have accurate information regarding
who is influencing their government, and it will give religious groups
enough leeway to openly practice their faiths with their own members in
any way they deem fit, without running afoul the lobbying rules. Such
equality will also serve as a benefit to lawmakers applying philosophies
of political survival as a tool to gauge their constituents’ desires.
Ultimately, a reform of lobbying regulations will allow everyone to get a
piece of the political pie, but also to see how much pie their neighbor has
taken for themselves.

296. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
297. See ASLAN, supra note 59, at xii; see also supra Section I.A (exploring the evolution
of human thought on God).
298. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
299. See supra Sections II.A–B.
300. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-91(6) (2018) (exempting intra-organization
communication from qualifying as a lobbying expenditure, regardless of the group).

